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AGENCY AND THE A-SERIES 
 
Roman Altshuler 
SUNY Stony Brook 
Following McTaggart’s distinction of two series – the A-series and the B-
series – according to which we understand time, much of the debate in the 
philosophy of time has been about our beliefs with regard to time, their 
tenses, and the relation between these beliefs and reality.  While McTaggart 
hoped to show that neither series was applicable to reality – that, in fact, only 
an atemporal C-series was conceptually coherent – most philosophers have 
attempted to bypass this conclusion and instead defend either the A-series or 
the B-series as providing the true account of reality.  Arguments grounded in 
our experience – traditionally the stronghold of the A-theorists – have by and 
large been about the beliefs involved in, or descriptive of that experience.  
The arguments have, however, been flawed in their attempt to draw on our 
experience for evidence of A-properties, and B-theorists have been quick to 
note these flaws.  After examining some problems with the standard 
experience-grounded arguments for the existence of A-properties, I will 
argue that there is a type of entity in the world that – because its ontology 
involves irreducibly tensed experience – cannot exist within a tenseless 
reality.  This entity is the rational agent.  If the real world is to include 
agents, it will have the past, present, and future as well.
I.  The Role of Experience in A-theories and B-theories 
The A-series orders events into past, present, and future.  The B-series orders 
those same events relative to each other as earlier and later.  In distinguishing 
these two views of time, McTaggart (1908) set out both the problem that 
would follow the philosophy of time for the next century – that of 
determining how the two series might be related to reality and which of them 
provides a correct description – and much of the framework within which the 
debates would be waged.  Even then, McTaggart had already noticed a 
strong bias in favor of the B-series.  B-properties, it seems, are the properties 
required by science, and thus seem to better fit with the notion of a mind-
independent reality.  The A-series seems more closely connected to the ways 
we experience time, and as such might be taken to be mind-dependent. 
A certain naturalist program, seeking to limit ontology to entities open to 
study by the empirical sciences, has consequently encouraged attempts to 
explain away the apparent indispensability of the A-series.  Much as a 
scientific image might be thought capable of replacing the manifest image, 





reducible to the terms of a tenseless temporal series.  McTaggart, of course, 
wanted to show that both temporal ways of representing reality are mistaken: 
he argued that the A-series is indispensable to time because it alone can 
account for change, but the A-series cannot coherently be applied to reality.  
Consequently, an atemporal C-series is our only option.  But his account of 
change, among other things, turned out to be highly problematic, often 
allowing the B-theorist to marshal the full force of McTaggart’s argument 
against the A-theorist without being forced to deny the reality of time. 
Experience has thus been the A-theorist’s traditional refuge.  Even if 
reality is tenseless, we certainly seem to experience it as tensed.  But if our 
experience is part of reality, then it seems to follow that at least something in 
reality is tensed.  In arguing for the unreality of time, McTaggart of course 
anticipated a similar objection.  In response, he noted that we do indeed 
experience events as past, present, and future.  We remember, perceive, or 
anticipate various occurrences.  But this does not prove that the events 
themselves change their qualities – memory, perception, and anticipation are 
different mental states with different qualities, but this fact does not show 
that the objects of these states also differ in quality.  The B-theorist can lift 
this argument from McTaggart against the A-theorist.  Let us take up this last 
point. 
 
II.  Accounting for Temporal Experience 
Attempts to eliminate A-properties seem to come into conflict with some 
readily apparent features of our experience.  As just mentioned, we tend to 
remember some events and anticipate others.  To remember event X is to 
now represent X to myself and, furthermore, represent it as past.  This 
implies that at some point I experienced the event as present and, before that, 
perhaps anticipated its occurrence as future.  Our experience, and our beliefs 
about that experience, appear to be tensed.  Doesn’t this suggest that reality 
is ordered according to an A-series? There are a number of ways of making 
this argument.
1
  Prior (1959) famously pointed out that when I exclaim 
“thank goodness that’s over!” I am expressing relief about a tensed fact 
which would not make sense on a tenseless B-theory: my relief is not that 
some event is earlier than the time of my utterance, but that the event is past.  
Smith (1988) echoes this by noting that a number of emotions, e.g., nostalgia 
or eagerness, are caused by beliefs that some events are past or future rather 
than simply earlier or later.
2
 
 But arguments of this sort – arguments that appeal to our beliefs about 
our experience of time – face powerful counter arguments.  Our tensed 
beliefs and experiences might be products of an underlying tenseless reality.  
An error theory for tensed beliefs and experiences might explain the problem 
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away.  Barbour (1999), for example, reminds us that our memories, 
anticipations, etc., are the products of neural states, those being reducible to 
the positions of fundamental particles.  The state of the world frozen at any 
instant will include my various mental states.  Barbour thus defends a time-
capsule theory: reality is composed entirely of static Nows, or frozen 
instants.  That I have memories or feel time passing is no guarantee that 
those memories are of something past or that time really is passing.3
There are less drastic ways of defending tenselessness, and ones that 
don’t deny the reality of time.  When we look at what our experiential beliefs 
entail, we might find that the most reasonable way of accounting for their 
truth is a tenseless one.  The advantage of this approach is that it allows for 
the reality of our experience, but denies that the experienced reality is tensed.  
Take the case of episodic memory, i.e., a memory of some past experience.  
This means that the truth-maker of the memory belief should contain the 
truth-maker of the original experience belief, since the former should entail 
the latter.  On the B-theory, this is unproblematic: the truth-maker for the 
belief that I am having an experience now is that I have this experience at 
time t0; the truth maker for the memory at t1 is the same, together with the 
proposition that t1 is later than t0.  According to the A-theory, on the other 
hand, the first truth-maker states that the experience is occurring now, while 
the second states that the experience occurred in the past.  But there is no 
entailment relation between these propositions, so the A-theory fails to 
explain a crucial feature of memory, namely, the entailment relation between 
my having had an experience and my remembering that experience 
(LePoidevin, 2006).  But why, if tenseless facts account for our experiences 
and beliefs better than tensed ones, are our beliefs tensed?
The B-theorist, to put doubts to rest, must answer this final question.  
Mellor (1998; 2001), in particular, is keen to hold on to the B-theory but 
defend it from objections by giving the A-theorists everything – one might 
think – that they want: he avoids the error theory approach and, instead, takes 
one closer to illusionism.  Tensed beliefs, he holds, are usually true, and 
irreducible.  This last point – about irreducibility – is a bit of a farce.  What 
Mellor means is that the beliefs themselves are about pasts, presents, and 
futures, and these cannot be reduced to anything else.  But the facts that 
make our tensed beliefs true are, themselves, tenseless.  I might, for example, 
believe that now I am tired, but I was not tired in the past – when I had my 
coffee – and will not be in the future, when I sleep.  This may well be true, 
but what makes it true has nothing to do with A-properties.  What makes it 
true is that a particular person, Roman Altshuler, is tired on June 29, 2008 at 





have different tensed beliefs at different times, and this gives rise to the 




III.  Agency and Time 
But the A-theorist has another option.  Let us look at why Mellor thinks we 
need true tensed beliefs.  The reason lies in action theory.  The now 
dominant view of rational actions is that they are caused by beliefs and 
desires (on most accounts, via an intention).
5
  Because actions need to occur 
at particular times, the beliefs that cause them must be tensed beliefs; for the 
actions to succeed, they must also be true beliefs.  For example, I must catch 
a train at 5 p.m.  The belief that 5 p.m. is in the future is involved in my 
packing and taking a cab to the train station.  To actually catch the train, I 
must at 5 p.m. have the belief that 5 p.m. is now.  If the belief is false – if, 
when I think “now is 5 p.m.” it is actually 6 p.m. – then I have missed the 
train.
6
  Mellor’s suggestion is that we have tensed beliefs, usually true ones, 
because evolution made it so: to survive, we must be capable of doing things 
on time, and to intentionally do anything on time, we must be capable of 
orienting ourselves in time by distinguishing past, present, and future.
7
  But 
nothing in the world need correspond to these A-beliefs – the necessary facts 
are that the train leaves at 5 p.m., that I must leave my house by 4:15 p.m. to 
get there on time, and that by 4:58 p.m.  I must be waiting on the platform.  
Seemingly, then, tensed beliefs can be perfectly true without implying that 
any fact corresponds to them.
8
 
 Let us go back to action theory.  As already mentioned, on the standard 
view rational action is caused, by way of an intention, by some combination 
of beliefs and desires.  To have a reason for action thus involves having some 
sort of desire.  This is contentious, though I think the objections are 
answerable.
9
  In any case, we need not press this issue, since Mellor already 
accepts the causal theory of action.  But if desires and intentions (partially) 
cause actions, what features must these desires and intentions have in order 
to be causal? From a third-person perspective, we might say that desires and 
intentions are mental states, perhaps standing in token-token relationships 
with neural states, that cause (or are dispositionally constituted to cause) 
bodily movements.  But events in my brain or occurring mental states that 
are not desires or intentions, that I am not and cannot even become aware of, 
may also cause bodily movements.  In that case, my bodily movement would 
not be an action or, at any rate, not a rational or voluntary one.  Furthermore, 
if my bodily movement is to be an action, the desires must cause it in the 
right way; not every causal path from an occurrent desire to a bodily 
movement will yield an action.
10
  What distinguishes desires or intentions, 
particularly those that cause actions in the right way, from other neural or 
Agency and the A-Series
157
mental states or from desires and intentions that cause behaviors in deviant 
ways? What, in other words, accounts for desires’ and intentions’ causal 
power as desires and intentions, and so their causing of actions and not just 
bodily movements?
One feature that distinguishes desires and intentions from other states 
and, more importantly, that sets apart their unique causal mechanism, is that 
desires and intentions represent their object11 to an agent as future.
12
A
tenseless account will not work here.  Of course we can say that the action, 
or the state of affairs it brings about, occurs later than the desire that causes 
it.  But this is a third-personal view; it allows us to place desires into the 
causal succession of events leading up to the production of an action, but it 
fails to account for the feature that makes the desire causally active in the 
first place: first-personally, for the agent who acts on this desire, it is directed 
toward something future.  Of course we might wish for something that is not 
future – for example, I might wish that it were now yesterday so that I could 
avoid that stupid thing I did after dinner.  But that sort of desire is in 
principle incapable of causing an action.13 Desires that can cause actions can 
only do so by virtue of being oriented toward the future. 
Intentions aim at a future performance; if they are intentions-in-
action (Searle, 2001), then they aim at a present performance.  And I think 
analogous arguments may be made with regard to other features of agency – 
responsibility, for example, refers to the past – so that the entire framework 
of agential and moral experience is inseparable from a human reliance on A-
properties.  But we can leave these issues for a later time.  The important 
point is this: while a desire or intention may occur earlier than the action it 
causes, and an intention-in-action may occur simultaneously with that action, 
desires and intentions cannot function as desires and intentions simply by 
representing something as later-than or simultaneous with the moment at 
which the agent experiences them.  Though we can anticipate or hope for 
something that will occur later, and we might see something happen later 
than the moment at which another person decides to accomplish it, we cannot 
desire objects that are merely later occurrences for us.  If the agent is not 
experiencing an object as future, then the state he is in is not a desire or 
intention.  And if such a state causes a bodily movement, that movement will 
not be an action. 
IV.  Intrinsic Temporal Vectors 
I think this account survives the standard objections.  For one, it excludes the 
possibility of a C-series or a B-series being sufficient to explain reality.  Or, 
at least, we would have to drop from reality something besides A-properties.  





reference.  A B-series or C-series alone cannot include desires and intentions 
within its ontology; consequently, it cannot include actions or agents.  It can, 
of course, include mechanisms moving in response to causal inputs, such that 
the movement occurs later than the input.  But again, this will no longer be a 
recognizable picture of agency.  The causal account of agency differs from 
other kinds of causal accounts precisely because the causal elements 
involved have their causality only by virtue of their first-personal nature.  
And if we leave out the first-personal aspect of these elements, we can no 




We should note that “future,” “present,” and “past” here do not refer to 
properties of relations to real objects, but only to properties of the relations 
themselves.  It is certainly possible to desire something that never comes to 
be; it is even possible to have an intention-in-action while performing an 
action different from the one the agent takes herself to be performing.  Nor 
do they refer to beliefs – I need not believe that the object of my desire is in 
the future in order to desire or intend it; I need only to have a representation 
of the object as future.
15
  The B-theory works well enough when we assume 
that reality contains only third-personal entities and beliefs about those 
entities.  As soon as we recognize that agency – or, more precisely, the kind 
of organized experience required for agency – is part of reality, however, we 
find reality thoroughly permeated by A-properties. 
It is neither surprising nor accidental that LePoidevin focuses on episodic 
memory, which he takes to be reducible to propositional claims, while 
Mellor discusses only the belief component of agency, as if agents were 
situated within a temporal order entirely by their clocks.  But we cannot 
provide B-properties on which the A-properties central to agency might 
depend.  Since desires and intentions are not beliefs, their occurrence does 
not depend on tenseless truth-makers.  What makes it true that the object of 
my desire is future is not that my desire refers to an object that will occur at a 
time later than the occurrence of the desire (a fact completely irrelevant to 
the issue), but simply the fact that I have a desire.  Unlike beliefs, which 
require only a particular direction of fit with regard to their objects, desires 
and intentions contain an intrinsic temporal vector.
16
  
This account allows A-properties to exist even in a C-series time capsule.  
Within a Now, my desire may not, in time, lead to my performing an action.  
But if there are actions, then there are desires, and if there are desires, then 
there are A-properties.  Since the temporal vector (in the case of desires and 
intentions, “future” is the vector that relates the state to its object) is intrinsic 
to the mental state itself, it cannot be ontologically eliminated even by the 
elimination of time.  If there are entities called agents, then they have mental 




states like desires and intentions.  And these mental states cannot exist unless 
they refer to future objects. 
 The A-properties I have described are rather different from those 
traditionally defended by A-theorists, because they do not involve either any 
flow of time or change.  They merely indicate directions according to which 
experience must be organized so as to allow for agency.
17
  It is possible that 
the A-properties by which all our activity in the world is organized provide 
the foundation for an experience of the flow of time without themselves 
giving us succession.  And this is precisely why the debate between A-
theorists and B-theorists is wrong to focus the question on which of these 
two series is the true one.  What is rarely mentioned is that both may be true 
(Smith, 1985).  Together with the B-series, by which the events we 
experience are ordered, the directional A-properties allow us to influence the 
events within this order.  It follows that both series can be adopted without 
redundancy: the A-series does not give us anything that the B-series has.
18
  
The B-series provides a temporal world for us to experience.  A-properties 
make it a world we can act in. 
 
Notes                                                     
1 Obviously, since such arguments assert the reality of the A-series, they are meant to 
challenge both B-theories and C-theories. 
2 Craig (2001) has similarly argued that a perfectly rational wish – the wish that it were 
now some other time – could not be rational unless there really were tensed facts, particularly, 
the fact that now is now. 
3 “If, as I have suggested, all our conscious experiences have their origin in real structure 
within the Nows, we can do without the fiction of the moving present. The sense we have that 
time has advanced to the present Now is simply our awareness of being in that Now.” 
(Barbour, 1999, p. 44) There are, of course, problems: if experience is entirely the causal 
product of the state of the world, it becomes unclear how any experience could tell us 
anything about the state of the world, and this opens a direct path to skepticism. 
4 “These, and all the other changes we are continually making in our A-series beliefs, are 
real changes, with real causes and real mental and physical effects. They are the changes that 
embody our experience of the flow of time. Even though time does not flow in reality, in our 
minds the time of our lives really does flow.” (Mellor, 2001) This is somewhat mysterious, 
but the point is clear. It is also strange: changing beliefs can give rise to an experience of 
change in beliefs, but how can they give rise to an experience of time flowing? I can 
experience a bell tolling continuously for a full minute without, at any point, forming the 
belief “the bell is striking now.”  See Smith (1988) for a related point. 
5 This theory, of course, got its major contemporary start with Davidson (1963). 
6 “This is what makes all agents need true beliefs with B-truth-conditions that vary over 
time and space. Without them we could not time or place the myriad actions which, if they are 
to get us what we want, must be done at the right B-time and right B-place. True B-beliefs 
alone, precisely because they are true always and everywhere, cannot tell us when or where to 





                                                                                                                             
7 There is some reason to be skeptical here: there are plenty of surviving species that, 
most likely, have no tensed beliefs whatsoever. This again suggests that the experience of time 
is not, at bottom, a matter of having beliefs. 
8 Not everyone is convinced, of course. If tense involves a semantic contradiction in 
reality that leads us to reject the A-series, why don’t similar contradictions apply to our tensed 
beliefs? That is, it seems impossible to preserve irreducible and true A-beliefs while sticking 
to a B-theory. (Ludlow, 1999) 
9 See Williams (1979) for the classic statement that having reasons involves having 
desires. I think the claim becomes significantly more solid if we keep in mind two features: 
first, that “desire” is here a stand-in for a wide class of mental states (pro-attitudes, in 
Davidson’s terminology, or members of an agent’s motivational set, in Williams’s). Second, 
that the claim need not be that the prior existence of desires is necessary for reasons to exist – 
instead, the reasons might give rise to desires. This suffices, I believe, to respond to such 
criticisms as those raised by Nagel (1970) or Korsgaard (1986). 
10 This is the problem of deviant causal chains. 
11 I use “object” here in a broad sense – the object of a desire is an intentional object, 
which need not be a particular thing, but can be a state of affairs or even just an action. 
12 This is not, of course, meant to suggest that representing an action as future is all that 
is needed to explain how desires or intentions can cause an action. The point is only that 
unless they do so represent the object, they cannot cause an action in the way that desires or 
intentions do cause actions. 
13 Or, rather, of causing an action directly and in the right way. It might cause some 
action in the wrong way – for example, the desire might make me so unhappy that I start 
crying. Or it might cause other actions indirectly – by solidifying my resolve never to do that 
stupid thing again. A related point is that I can desire something past – for example, that I 
were back in my last relationship. But if it is not a mere wish, this desire is a desire for 
something future – to restore the relationship. 
14 It should be added that my argument is, obviously, not merely an appeal to the 
asymmetry between cause and effect; that would be must as likely to serve as an argument for 
B-theory as for A-theory. Rather, my claim is that in understanding agency, we have to 
recognize A-properties as built in to (at least) one of the causes. 
15 This is not to say that no beliefs need be involved in our having causally effective 
desires. It is certainly impossible to desire – at least in a causally effective way – something 
that one has no knowledge of. I cannot, for example, desire a vacation in Paris if I have never 
heard of Paris. And knowledge of the object of desire may well include beliefs about that 
object. But these beliefs have no bearing on the temporal fact of the representation. 
16 Of course one could argue that without B-properties, desires and intentions could never 
meet their conditions of satisfaction. But even if this were right, it would still leave their A-
properties untouched. 
17 But it may well be, as Bachelard (1950) once suggested, that the flow of time is only a 
higher order experience, which we construct intellectually out of more basic particulars. 
18 Though we can drop the C-series altogether, since the elements central to it are already 
included in the B-series. 
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